A Comparison of the Evolution and Pace of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters: A Race Between Europol and Eurojust? by Gless, Sabine & Wahl, Thomas
 Part V 
 The Quest for Balance Regarding 
Criminal Justice Actors and in Their 
Mutual Relations 

 1  Cf  M  Coninsx ,  ‘ Eurojust ’ in  V  Mitsilegas ,  M  Bergstr ö m and  T  Konstadinides (eds),  Research 
 Handbook on European Criminal Law ( Edward Elgar ,  2016 )  454 :  ‘ yet the European Union is composed 
of interactions among 30 different legal systems and 24 working languages. Such differences between 
national legal systems must be taken into account when establishing a novel European actor and its set 
of competences ’. 
 2  Cf Council Decision 2009/371/JHA [2009] OJ L121/37, Recital 7; see also  S  Gless ,  ‘ Europol ’ in 
 V  Mitsilegas ,  M  Bergstr ö m and  T  Konstadinides (eds),  Research Handbook on European Criminal Law 
( Edward Elgar ,  2016 )  460 . 
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 I. About Roles and Functions 
 When thinking about how to address the  ‘ Comparison of the evolution and pace 
of police cooperation and judicial cooperation ’ topic, we immediately thought 
about a purported Europol vs Eurojust  ‘ race ’ — a kind of disequilibrium or com-
petitive relationship that could be observed in the last 10 years. We realised that —
 at least from the perspective of a university  ‘ ivory tower ’ — it would not be easy 
to discover the rules of this comparison between police cooperation and judi-
cial cooperation, since this cooperation features a multitude of legal frameworks, 
working languages, actors and stakeholders. 1 
 Starting from the drawing board of EU policy-makers, the two EU agencies in 
charge of cross-border cooperation in criminal matters developed more or less 
according to the plan set by national decision-makers, in their respective fi elds: 
 Europol has been responsible for police cooperation and data exchange from an 
early stage, but it has, up to now, had no formal executive power or command over 
national law enforcement authorities and thus bears very limited responsibility for 
 ‘ operations on the ground ’ ; the cyberspace, however, may be a different matter. 2 
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 3  Cf  T  Wahl ,  ‘ The European Union as an Actor in the Fight Against Terrorism ’ in  M  Wade and 
 A  Maljevic (eds),  A war on terror ? ( Springer  2010 )  107, 144 . 
 4  Council Decision 2009/426/JHA [2009] OJ L138/14. For the reform see also Mich è le Coninsx 
(n 1 above) 442 et seq. 
 5  T Wahl (n 3 above) 147. 
 6  The term  ‘ law enforcement ’ is used here in a wider sense not only referring to police and other com-
petent law enforcement authorities which dissuade or discover criminal activity, but also includes the 
investigation and prosecution of criminal behaviour by the judiciary, ie the prosecutorial services and 
the criminal courts. For the use of the term in this sense cf (1974) 124  New Law Journal Part 1, p 358. 
 7  Other areas of possible comparison could have been the traffi cking in human beings, smuggling, 
large-scale fraud, etc. 
 8  Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union 
Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 
2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA [2016] OJ L135/53. 
Europol is considered the hub for information exchange in the Union — a role that 
is in the literature also described as Europol being the Union ’ s main  ‘ information 
broker ’ in the area of criminal law enforcement. 3 
 By comparison, Eurojust, which is responsible for the coordination of and coop-
eration between the judicial authorities of the 28 EU Member States, appears to be 
inherently more reserved and seems to stay a cautious step or two behind Europol 
due to its role as a judicial authority. Although Eurojust ’ s operational capacities 
were stepped up in 2008, 4 Eurojust is mainly a coordinator and advisor that pays 
close attention to traditional legal frameworks. Its role can be briefl y described as 
a  ‘ supranational coordinating and clearing house ’ , which is able to quickly solve legal 
problems or render mutual legal assistance more effective when national prosecu-
tions deal with cross-border crime. 5 
 On the basis of these initial considerations, it is assumed that the roles of these 
two European Union bodies essentially are the same as those allocated at national 
level: the police involved in operational actions and the judiciary balancing the 
different interests at stake. It therefore appears that the question is not so much 
about the challenge as to who is fi rst or who is a step ahead in a race between the 
police and the judiciary but rather whether the two bodies have found their place 
within the scenario of multi-level law enforcement. 6 
 In the following section (II), we verify this assumption by looking at the deve-
lopment of these two European Union agencies and their mission in the area of 
freedom, security and justice. This is exemplifi ed by the agencies ’ role in the fi ght 
against terrorism and cybercrime. 7 We further scrutinise whether our analysis of 
the status quo will be valid in view of the reform of the legal frameworks gover-
ning the role and function of the two bodies. The adaptations under the European 
Union ` s Lisbon Treaty have been made for Europol by Regulation (EU) 2016/794 
of 11 May 2016, 8 and the question arises as to what will come out of it in the future. 
Subsequently, in section III, we examine which (common) challenges the two 
institutions must meet henceforth, focusing on two issues: (A) are Europol and 
Eurojust able to fi nd a  European response to new cross-border crime  phenomena; 
and (B) is accountability ensured for them and their agents ? 
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 9  For further information see  S  Puntscher Rickmann ,  ‘ Security, Freedom and  Accountability : 
 Europol and Frontex ’ in  E  Guild and  F  Geyer (eds),  Security versus Justice ? Police and  Judicial Coopera-
tion in the European Union ( Ashgate  2009 )  19 – 20 . 
 10  For further information see:  F  R Monaco ,  ‘ Europol :  The Culmination of the European Union ’ s 
International Police Cooperation Efforts ’ ( 1995 )  19  Fordham International Law Journal  247, 282 . 
 II. Mission Accomplished — Where does 
One Go Now ? 
 The European Union ’ s law-maker has set clear goals for both agencies giving 
them a mission for criminal justice cooperation, on the one hand, and police 
cooperation, on the other. 
 According to Article 85 TFEU,  Eurojust ’ s mission is to support and strengthen 
 coordination and cooperation between the national authorities of the 28 Member 
States that conduct investigations into and prosecute serious cross-border crime. 
By equipping Eurojust with coordination and cooperation tools, promoting a fl u-
ent exchange of information, giving it the mandate to assist with the application of 
the EU ’ s legal instruments based on the principle of mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions, and endorsing best practices across the EU, Eurojust contributes to close 
cross-border cooperation among the competent judicial authorities. 
 Europol ’ s mission , on the other hand, is — according to Article 88 TFEU — to sup-
port and strengthen  action by the Member States ’ police authorities and other 
law enforcement services. Within this mandate it will prevent and combat serious 
crime affecting two or more Member States, including terrorism and crimes which 
affect a common interest covered by a Union policy. By improving and facilitating 
information sharing by the competent national law enforcement authorities with 
Europol, equipping Europol with data systems and capacities to produce strate-
gic intelligence, establishing specialist knowledge (such as in the area of cyber-
crime) and extending Europol ’ s abilities to cooperate and build up partnerships 
with other EU institutions, international organisations and third states, as well as 
the private sector, Europol could fulfi ll its role as a support unit to national law 
enforcement activity. 
 Overall, both institutions have accomplished the goals given to them by 
primary EU law in recent decades.  Is that enough ? The answer depends on one ’ s 
ambition for the future of EU cooperation. 
 A. Europol 
 Europol commenced its activities in 1999 after Member States had agreed on the 
establishment of a European Police offi ce and eventually adopted the Europol 
Convention. 9 Its predecessor, the European Drugs Unit (EDU) had already 
become operational in the early 1990s. 10 
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 11  Monaco (n 10 above), 248 – 49, 274 – 77. 
 12  C  Ladenburger ,  ‘ Police and criminal law in the Treaty of Lisbon: a new dimension for the Com-
munity method ’ ( 2008 )  4  European Criminal Law Review  20, 23 ; Thomas Wahl (n 3 above) 144 – 45. 
 13  See, for instance,  M  Tebaldi / M  Calaresu ,  ‘ Level of Europeanization and Policy  Outcomes :  The 
Common Security Policy and the Case of Europol ’ ( June 2013 )  SAGE Open, 7 . 
 14  S Gless (n 2 above) 464 et seq. 
 15  For further information on the importance of data exchange as part of EU policy: 
 M  Fletcher ,  R  L ö ö f and  B  Gilmore ,  EU Criminal Law and Justice ( Edward Elgar Publishing  2008 ) 
 92 – 97 ;  A  Nunzi ,  ‘ Exchange of information and intelligence among law enforcement authorities. 
A  European Union perspective ’ ( 2007 )  78  Revue internationale de droit p é nal  143, 147 – 48 . 
 16  T Wahl (n 3 above) 145; see furthermore  S  Roz é e ,  C  Kaunert and  S  L é onard ,  ‘ Is Europol a 
 Comprehensive Policing Actor ? ’ ( 2013 )  14  Perspectives on European Politics and Society  374 . 
 17  See, for instance, Europol Review,  General Report on Europol Activities , 2009, p 17. 
 From the very start, Europol ’ s mandate was directed to  ‘ action ’ , but predomi-
nantly in the digital world and in the processing of data. 
 As is well known, Europol was designed from the start with a main focus on 
data exchange between the national authorities of EU Member States and as the 
nucleus of a European intelligence unit. 11 The data mandate was subsequently 
extended to more areas of crime (including, for instance, terrorism), 12 but the EU 
Member States never ventured into making Europol a European  ‘ FBI ’ with real 
operational competences. Article 88 paragraph 3 TFEU still sets the limit: 
 Any operational action by Europol must be carried out in liaison and in agreement with 
the authorities of the Member State or States whose territory is concerned. The applica-
tion of coercive measures shall be the exclusive responsibility of the competent national 
authorities. 
 In 2009, Europol was transformed into an EU agency. This transformation 
strengthened the European infl uence on Europol as it made it subject to general 
rules and procedures applicable to EU agencies. 13 These general rules and pro-
cedures not only include budgeting and auditing, but also affect the revision of 
the legal basis and — to a limited extent — the judicial oversight of Europol by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 14 
 Europol ’ s powers lie basically in producing intelligence, 15 but it also offers 
direct assistance to national units. Europol ’ s activities with regard to preventing 
and combating alleged terrorist threats are a good example in this context. Two 
months after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the US the Counter-Terrorist Task 
Force (CTTF) became operational. In 2007, the CTTF was transferred to the First 
Response Network. Europol was mandated to (1) collect in a timely manner all 
relevant information and intelligence concerning the current terrorist threat in 
the EU; (2) analyse the collected information and undertake the necessary opera-
tional and strategic analysis; and (3) draft a threat assessment document based 
on information received. 16 In addition, Europol developed several products and 
services that assist law enforcement authorities in the Member States in conduc-
ting ongoing investigations. 17 Europol has adjusted its capabilities continuously. 
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 18  For more information about the ECTC see  https://www.europol.europa.eu/crime-areas-and-
trends/crime-areas/terrorism , accessed 3 August 2017; see also  Cornelia  Riehle , ( 2016 )  eucrim  69 – 70 . 
 19  Europol ,  ‘ European cybercrime centre-EC3 ’ :  https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/
european-cybercrime-centre-ec3 , accessed  3 August 2017 . 
 20  See  Europol ,  ‘ Joint cybercrime action taskforce (J-CAT) ’ :  https://www.europol.europa.eu/ec3/
joint-cybercrime-action-taskforce-j-cat , accessed  3 August 2017 . 
 21  Regulation (EU) 2016/794 (n 8 above), Art 4 para 1(l) and (m). 
In January 2016, the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) was launched 
at Europol and reacts to the new Jihadist terrorism which threatens the EU 
(in particular marked by the attacks on  Charlie Hebdo in January 2015). The main 
function of the ECTC is to be a hub to exchange information, conduct analysis and 
coordinate operational support. The ECTC is able to provide quick and effective 
support on a 24/7 basis to counter-terrorism and criminal investigations when the 
terrorist event has a transnational or international scope. The support includes the 
analyses of an enormous amount of data generated by the criminal investigations, 
establishment of mobile offi ces or provision of Arab language experts who are able 
to monitor websites and social media in Arabic or track networks that support the 
fi nancing of terrorist activities. 18 
 Beyond the fi ght against specifi c physical cross-border crime threats, Europol 
is largely involved in preventing and combating cybercrime. Europol has been 
using its cybercrime mandate and has been hosting the European Cybercrime 
Centre (EC3) since 2013. The EC3 19 is meant to coordinate cross-border law 
enforcement activities against cybercrime, provide technological expertise to the 
competent national authorities and assist national authorities in their efforts to 
dismantle and disrupt cybercrime networks. The EC3 has a promising future and 
has already expanded its staff and activities. Among other projects, it hosts a Joint 
Cybercrime Action Taskforce (J-CAT), which is composed of cyber liaison offi -
cers from EU Member States and non-EU partners, as well as offi cers from EC3. 
The taskforce operates in a rather fl exible legal framework, following the objective 
 ‘ to pro-actively drive intelligence-led, coordinated action against key cybercrime 
threats and top targets ’ . 20 
 The new legal framework confi rms Europol ’ s shift in its action to focus police 
work on cyberspace. Regulation (EU) 2016/794 now provides a legal setting 
for this approach by pointing out, in the description of Europol ’ s task, that the 
(already existing) European Cybercrime Centre should be further developed and 
that Europol is to support Member States ’ actions in preventing and combating 
forms of crime which are facilitated, promoted or committed using the Internet. 21 
 In addition, the new legal framework seems to change the role of Europol. In 
this regard, two issues are particularly striking for us, which are somewhat hid-
den in Regulation (EU) 2016/794. Firstly, the new Regulation indeed still con-
tains a provision according to which Europol can request Member States to 
initiate criminal investigations. However, a few changes have been inserted. For 
instance, the new provision refrains from using the words that the Member States 
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 22  Cf Art 7 para 1 Council Decision 2009/371/JHA vs. Art 6 para 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/794. 
 23  Regulation (EU) 2016/794 (n 8 above), Art 6 paras 1 and 2 read as follows: 
 ‘ (1) In specifi c cases where Europol considers that a criminal investigation should be initiated 
into a crime falling within the scope of its objectives, it shall request the competent authorities of the 
Member States concerned via the national units to initiate, conduct or coordinate such a criminal 
investigation. 
 (2) The national units shall inform Europol without delay of the decision of the competent 
authorities of the Member States concerning any request made pursuant to paragraph 1. ’ 
 24  See Regulation (EU) 2016/794 (n 8 above), Art 6:  ‘ In specifi c cases where Europol considers that a 
criminal investigation should be initiated into a crime falling within the scope of its objectives, it shall 
request the competent authorities of the Member States concerned via the national units to initiate, 
conduct or coordinate such a criminal investigation. ’ 
 25  Regulation (EU) 2016/794 (n 8 above), Recital 23. 
 26  Regulation (EU) 2016/794 (n 8 above), Recital 24. 
 27  R  Sicurella and  V  Scalia ,  ‘ Data Mining and Profi ling in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice ’ 
( 2013 )  4  New Journal of European Criminal Law  409, 420 with further references. 
shall give such requests  ‘ due consideration ’ 22 and introduces a time-limit for 
national authorities to justify their decision not to follow Europol ’ s requests. 23 
Herewith, Europol ’ s request should become more  ‘ powerful ’ although the request 
remains non-binding in nature since it is (still) up to the national authorities to 
 comply with the request or not. As a consequence, however, Europol ’ s abilities to 
instruct or direct national police authorities to launch criminal investigations are 
reinforced by the new provision. 24 
 Even more prominent is the second issue: Regulation (EU) 2016/794 stresses 
that Europol should  ‘ have the fullest and most up-to-date information possible  … 
in order to develop an understanding of criminal phenomena and trends to 
gather information about criminal networks, and to detect links between differ-
ent criminal offences ’ . 25 Europol further explicitly receives a green light  ‘ to choose 
the most effi cient IT structure ’ , in order to  ‘ be able to swiftly detect links between 
investigations and common modi operandi across different criminal groups, to 
check cross-matches of data and to have a clear overview of trends ’ . 26 This  ‘ vision ’ 
is implemented by Article 18 which foresees, inter alia, that Europol may pro-
cess personal data for the purpose of  ‘ operational analyses ’ . Although Article 18 
 paragraph 3 of Regulation (EU) 2016/794 includes some guarantees for data pro-
tection, in the case of these  ‘ operational analyses ’ , the legal text nowhere mentions 
 ‘ how ’ these analyses are carried out. In short, the new legal framework endorses 
Europol ’ s capacity in carrying out data-mining operations. Data mining is defi ned 
as the technique of exploring sets of data in order to identify interesting structures 
in the data, including patterns, statistical or predictive models of the data and 
relationships among parts of the data. 27 This possibility presents certain risks with 
regard to respect for data protection standards and illustrates once more Europol ’ s 
move towards having a more active role, almost comparable to the role of national 
police services. If Europol goes down this road, it must also meet the requirements 
for police authorities with regard to accountability set for national police. 
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 28  Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinfor-
cing the fi ght against serious crime [2002] OJ L63/1. 
 29  Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the strengthening of Eurojust and 
amending Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fi ght against 
 serious crime. This Decision was adopted by the Council in December 2008 and took effect on the 
day of its publication in the Offi cial Journal of the European Union [2009] OJ L138/1 (04.06.2009). 
 30  Á  Guti é rrez Zarza ,  Exchange of Information and Data Protection in Cross-border Criminal Proceed-
ings in Europe ( Springer  2015 )  79 . 
 31  ‘ Eurojust paper on the ENCS structure and profi le of the national correspondent for  Eurojust ’ 
(Eurojust, 11 July 2011):  http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/Practitioners/objectives-tools/Docu-
ments/Eurojust%20Note%20on%20the%20Eurojust%20National%20Coordination%20System%
20%28ENCS%29/ENCS-and-National-Correspondent-for-Eurojust.pdf , accessed 3 August 2017. 
 32  See also Art 12 para 5 of the 2008 Eurojust Council Decision (n 29 above). 
 33  T Wahl (n 3 above) 147;  Eurojust News (October 2009) Issue No 1 on the fi ght against terrorism. 
 B. Eurojust 
 By comparison, Eurojust ’ s work appears to be rather low-key in nature. A provi-
sional unit (called Pro-Eurojust) located in Brussels started to operate some years 
after Europol, in March 2001, with the mission to enhance judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 accelerated the 
development of various forms of judicial cooperation, including the formal estab-
lishment of Eurojust in 2002 by a Council Decision, 28 with a seat in The Hague. 
 Today, after the revision of Eurojust ’ s legal framework in 2008, a strengthened 
College, composed of one National Member for each Member State, is responsible 
for Eurojust ’ s organisation and operation. 29 The main task is to solve confl icts of 
jurisdictions or diffi culties in mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, such as 
extradition/surrender or the collection of evidence abroad. All College Members 
have a minimum set of powers to operate from their desk in their respective home 
countries; the powers, however, are set by national legislation. 
 Eurojust has not been designed for operational action. Its priority rather lies 
in increasing levels of judicial networking. An important tool in this regard is the 
Eurojust National Coordination System (ENCS). Its goal is to guarantee in each 
Member State the effective and swift fl ow of information between the judicial 
authorities at the national level, from the national member to Eurojust and from 
the national contact points to the European Judicial Network in criminal matters 
(EJN). 30 A Eurojust National Correspondent in each Member State is responsible 
for the functioning of the ENCS and the correspondent serves as ‘the lighthouse’ 
for the other ENCS members, and for the Eurojust National Member. 31 By means 
of the ENCS, the tasks of Eurojust in the Member States should be facilitated, 
ensuring, inter alia, that Eurojust ’ s case management system is fed with enough and 
reliable information and defi ning Eurojust ’ s competence in relation to the EJN. 32 
 As mentioned above, the establishment of Eurojust is closely linked to the 
 terrorist attacks of 2001. As a result, Eurojust is also considered a key player in 
the EU ’ s fi ght against terrorism, and combating terrorism is one of its priorities. 33 
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 34  O Bures,  EU Counterterrorism Policy — A Paper Tiger ? (Routledge 2011) 117. 
 35  Cited by Oldrich Bures (n 34 above) referring to an Interview with Mich è le Coninsx, at that time 
Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Team of Eurojust, in September 2009. 
 36  Council Decision 2005/671/JHA of 20 September 2005 on the exchange of information and 
cooperation concerning terrorist offences [2005] OJ L253/22, Art 2 paras 2, 3 and 5. 
 37  Eurojust News (October 2009) Issue No 1, p 3. 
 38  Cf  Eurojust press release of 25 November 2016 ,  ‘ Kick-off meeting for the European Judicial 
Cybercrime Network ’ :  http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/press/PressReleases/Pages/2016/2016-11-25.
aspx , accessed  3 August 2017 . For the underlying Council Conclusions see Thomas Wahl, (2016) 
 eucrim 75. 
 39  Eg with a representative at the EC3 (cf Eurojust Annual Report 2015:  http://www.eurojust.
europa.eu/doclibrary/corporate/eurojust%20Annual%20Reports/Annual%20Report%202015/
Annual-Report-2015-EN.pdf , accessed 3 August 2017, p 33). 
In the wake of the terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004, the College of 
 Eurojust set up a Counter-Terrorism (CT) Team within Eurojust and also created 
a scoreboard by means of which Eurojust keeps track of the progress achieved in 
major counter-terrorism initiatives. 34 The major purpose of these steps was to 
improve and facilitate networking, since a decision was taken  ‘ to progress from 
purely reactive coordination efforts to more proactive  … contributions in the fi ght 
against terrorism. ’ 35 Furthermore, Eurojust strives to gain expertise in all aspects 
of the phenomenon of terrorism. Since 2005, Member States have been obliged 
to  designate National Correspondents for Terrorism. These correspondents must 
provide Eurojust with certain items of information, including data which identify 
the person, group or entity that is the object of a criminal investigation or pro-
secution; the offence concerned and its specifi c circumstances; information about 
fi nal convictions for terrorist offences and the specifi c circumstances surroun-
ding those offences; links with other relevant cases; and requests for judicial assis-
tance, including letters rogatory, addressed to or by another Member State and the 
response. 36 The information received is processed in Eurojust ’ s case management 
system and analysed, if necessary, by legal analysts. 37 
 Recently, Eurojust has also been more and more involved in the fi ght against 
cybercrime. It set up a Task Force on Cybercrime and is supporting the European 
Judicial Cybercrime Network. The cybercrime network brings together practitio-
ners to share their experience and expertise regarding the challenges that are faced 
during investigations and prosecutions of cybercrime or cyber-enabled crimes, 
such as electronic evidence, the differentiated treatment of specifi c categories of 
data in criminal proceedings, encryption or jurisdiction. 38 Recently, Eurojust also 
took up efforts to strengthen cooperation between the judicial and law enforce-
ment authorities and takes part in some of Europol ’ s anti-cybercrime activities. 39 
 One of Eurojust ’ s most powerful tools remains rather informal and low profi le: 
coordination meetings. In such meetings, Eurojust brings together judicial autho-
rities from different Member States to exchange information on a specifi c case, to 
overcome possible obstacles to cooperation, and to ensure the speedy  execution of 
requests for judicial cooperation. Such meetings allow for the exchange of infor-
mation as well as for legal discussions. Both may lead to criminal investigations 
in the Member States. 
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 40  Council Decision 2009/426/JHA [2009] OJ L138/14, Art 6 para 1(a). Eurojust here acts through 
its national member(s) concerned. In a reduced manner, similar rights were conferred on the College 
of Eurojust, see Art 7 para 1(a) of said Council Decision. 
 41  Cf Council Decision 2009/426/JHA [2009] OJ L138/14, Art 9b. See also Coninsx (n 1 above) 445. 
 42  See also Coninsx (n 1 above) 452 – 53. 
 43  Proposal for a Regulation on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice  Cooperation 
 (Eurojust), COM(2013) 534 fi nal. For an overview of the proposal and a fi rst analysis see A  Weyembergh, 
 ‘ An Overall Analysis of the Proposal for a Regulation on Eurojust ’ (2013)  eucrim 127. 
 44  Further negotiations were put on hold in 2015 because advancement of the Regulation on 
the European Public Prosecutor ’ s Offi ce was awaited. The following refers to the draft regulation 
on  Eurojust in the version of the last and publicly available amendments by the Council: Council 
doc 6643/15 of 27 February 2015. 
 45  Coninsx (n 1 above) 453. See also Art 2 para 3 of the Draft Regulation, Council doc 6643/15. 
 In addition, Eurojust was granted several powers to exert infl uence on national 
investigations and prosecutions, such as the right to ask the competent authorities 
of the Member States concerned to undertake an investigation or prosecution of 
specifi c criminal acts, to request Member States to coordinate among themselves, 
to ask for specifi c investigative measures to be taken or to take any other measure 
justifi ed for the investigation or prosecution of a case. 40 In addition, the national 
members of Eurojust are — subject to national legislation — entitled to exercise cer-
tain powers in their capacity as a competent national authority. Most national 
members are entitled, for instance, in agreement with a national competent 
authority to issue complete requests for judicial cooperation, to execute in their 
Member State requests for judicial cooperation or to order in their Member State 
investigative measures considered necessary at a Eurojust coordination meeting. 41 
 As with Europol, Eurojust ’ s legal framework is under review. Likewise, Eurojust 
is to be  ‘ Lisbonised ’ , meaning that its structures and governance are to be aligned to 
the setting of the Lisbon Treaty (more precisely: the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the EU (TFEU)) as well as to the EU ’ s approach of de-centralised agencies. 42 Simi-
larly to Europol, the (current) legal basis of the Council Decision is to be replaced 
by a Regulation. In 2013, the Commission tabled a proposal, 43 on which the JHA 
Council reached a general approach at its meeting on 12 – 13 March 2015. 44 One 
of the objectives of the Eurojust reform is to strengthen the operational work in 
the fi ght against cross-border crime, as well as to increase operational effective-
ness. It is explicitly mentioned that Eurojust should act  ‘ on its own initiative ’ , by 
which Eurojust is imputed a more  ‘ proactive role ’ . 45 However, we must wait for the 
outcome of the negotiations of the legal text to know what that really means. 
 C. Europol vs Eurojust ? 
 Coming back to our preliminary question of whether there is a  ‘ race ’ to discover 
between police and judiciary at the European level, or whether both agencies —
 Europol and Eurojust — have found their own place in the European Union ’ s 
 setting of combating cross-border crime: the reader may fi rst observe that both 
have undergone parallel developments in priority policy areas, such as terrorism 
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 46  However, it should not be ignored that Eurojust has invested efforts in the fi ght against child 
pornography on the Internet in the past. 
 47  A  Weyembergh ,  I  Armada and  C  Bri è re ,  ‘ The inter-agency cooperation and future architecture 
of the EU criminal justice and law enforcement area ’ ( 2014 )  Study for the LIBE  Committee, 2014 :  http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/510000/IPOL_STU%282014%29510000_
EN.pdf , accessed  3 August 2017 , section 2.1.1.1(b). 
 48  Ibid. 
 49  Ibid. 
 50  Ibid. 
and cybercrime. Looking at the subject-matter may lead to the conclusion that 
 Eurojust is lagging behind Europol. Whereas Europol began to increase its  capacity 
to tackle terrorism shortly after 2001, it took the terrorist attacks of Madrid in 
2004 for Eurojust to reinforce its structures to tackle the phenomenon of ter-
rorism. Likewise, whereas Europol had already started to intensify expertise and 
knowledge about the crime phenomenon of cybercrime in 2013, Eurojust seems 
to have created similar structures three years later in 2016. 46 But on the national 
level, too, police force and judicial authorities keep up with the changing world of 
crime at a different pace. 
 However, the seemingly nearly identical powers of both agencies to request 
national authorities to initiate criminal investigations could indicate that there is 
competition between them. Is Europol not by nature regularly quicker to process 
relevant investigative data and forward them to national counterparts accompa-
nied with the request to go ahead with criminal investigations in the case which 
may fl ow in criminal prosecutions ? And yet, from a continental European point of 
view, should it not be the rule that the  ‘ judiciary ’ — ie Eurojust — takes the lead in 
providing the impetus for opening criminal prosecutions ? 
 Even if one takes the perspective of the inquisitorial model for criminal justice 
systems, with strong public prosecution services and  ‘ juges d ’ instruction ’ , who are 
in charge of criminal prosecution in many countries of the European continent, 
we do not believe that we can speak today about a  ‘ race ’ or  ‘ competition ’ . It is 
more appropriate to emphasise the functions of the two EU bodies in the area of 
freedom, security and justice. Focusing again on the EU ’ s architecture, Europol 
and Eurojust have, to date, each fulfi lled their assigned function. It has been cor-
rectly observed that both institutions target, in the fi rst place, different audi-
ences: national police authorities on the one hand; prosecutors and other judicial 
authorities on the other. 47 Therefore,  ‘ their activities are driven by different logics 
and concerns ’ . 48 Europol ’ s work has always been directed to  ‘ action ’ ; it is marked 
by effi ciency, pro-activeness and pragmatism. 49 By contrast, Eurojust has — in a 
quiet and discreet way — increasingly fulfi lled its key role as  ‘ facilitator ’ in enhan-
cing judicial coordination and cooperation within the EU; this is also true for the 
aforementioned crimes of terrorism and cybercrime. Eurojust does its work more 
behind the scenes and is less visible. It is to be understood from this that its work 
is focused on formalism and legal compliance, characteristics that correspond to 
judicial mindsets. 50 
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 This conclusion remains the same if we look at the agencies ’ powers to request 
the initiation of criminal proceedings in the EU Member States. Attention must 
be drawn to the fact that Europol and Eurojust operate in a multi-level criminal 
law enforcement environment, which respects the characteristics of the national 
criminal justice systems. Criminal investigations may be dealt with in one country 
by judicial authorities and in another by a police authority. The existence of two 
rights to ask for criminal investigations/prosecutions to be initiated is acceptable 
as long as it remains up to the national legal order how to further proceed with the 
information received from the supranational level. 
 Eventually, an important issue to consider when the two institutions are assessed 
is that although identical terms, such as  ‘ operation ’ or  ‘ pro-activeness ’ are used, 
their meaning may differ in different contexts. 51 Thus, the emphasis on increasing 
the operational capabilities of Eurojust in the new draft Regulation does not mean 
that Eurojust is given new powers to carry out operations, 52 but rather refers to a 
change of internal structures so that the national members of Eurojust can better 
concentrate on the casework, instead of spending time with additional adminis-
trative and managerial issues. 53 Similarly, the notion that Eurojust should have a 
more pro-active role refers to the  coordination of cases 54 rather than that it should 
carry out real operational analysis, which is work that continues to be reserved for 
Europol. 
 If the assessment that there is  ‘ no race ’ taking place between the two agencies, but 
rather a common effort in accordance with their respective raisons d ’ ê tre still holds 
true, the question remains as to whether this assessment is still valid if one looks 
less at the historical side of their activities, but rather on the future  competences 
assigned to Europol. In fact, today we might be facing a decisive break with the 
past. If Europol makes full use of its new competences and focuses on operational 
analyses, including data mining, its role could develop into a pace-setter as a  ‘ main 
detector of criminal activities ’ within the EU. 55 As a consequence, it would indeed 
be the supranational police force that takes the lead in producing evidence and it 
would be the judicial service (Eurojust) that would be behind, functioning as a 
sole  ‘ executor ’ of the police material. 56 If we add Europol ’ s  competences to request 
national authorities to initiate criminal investigations, there is even a growing risk 
that Europol could bypass its judicial counterpart at the  supranational level and 
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act  ‘ on its own initiative ’ . It is hoped, however, that both agencies will constantly 
work together and that Europol will not rush ahead without involving Eurojust 
properly. 57 
 III. Challenges for the Future — Law in Action 
 It is not enough just to put Europol and Eurojust side by side and to compare 
them. If we want to fulfi ll our task, we must also take into account which common 
challenges both institutions will face in the future and how these challenges are to 
be met. In this context, we will focus on two issues: 
 —  coming up with a  European value-based response to cross-border crime; 
 —  securing adequate accountability for the agencies themselves and their agents. 
 A. Delivering a European Value-based Response 
 A European response to cross-border crime must transcend national perspectives 
by combining ideas and pooling resources from the national criminal justice sys-
tems  and giving priority to European values. Transcending national perspectives 
means striving to develop an overall picture but it does not mean merely piling up 
more information; it can also mean identifying weaknesses and speaking up. As a 
chain is only as strong as its weakest link, information exchange and cooperation 
only works when everyone assists with it. Therefore, Europol and Eurojust must 
not only be provided with new databases, but the national police forces and other 
authorities must agree on and implement an adequate model of information-
sharing. The relevant authorities must identify weaknesses and speak up about 
them, not only but also with regard to effi ciency in terms of cooperation. In other 
words: in order to give a European response, the European agencies must strive 
not only for effi ciency, but also for values. That is not only necessary with regard to 
the Member States ’ level, but also with regard to the European or even global level. 
 Consequently, when implementing certain instruments, both Europol and 
Eurojust must themselves balance their interests in terms of the effi cient preven-
tion and combating of crimes, with the protection of human rights, including 
the citizens ’ right to privacy and protection of personal data as a European value 
nurtured in the history of this continent. 58 Again, Europol might be more exposed 
than Eurojust, and not solely in the domain of terrorism, but also in its cyberspace 
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activities. For instance  ‘ cyber patrols ’ and subsequent profi ling will raise privacy 
and human rights concerns. 59 
 The meaning of a  ‘ European ’ response in practice becomes particularly relevant 
if Europol and Eurojust interact with authorities outside the European Union. 
Reference in this regard must be made to the  ‘ safe harbour ’ — decision of the 
CJEU. 60 On the one hand, it was right that the European Union itself gave an 
answer to transnational data transfer agreements. Despite criticism of the deal 
reached between the EU and the US, such a mechanism for transferring data across 
the Atlantic would not have, and could not have been negotiated by one  European 
country on its own. On the other hand, the decision of the CJEU sets clear 
guidelines (also by referring to the landmark  ‘ Digital Rights Ireland ’  decision 61 ) 
on what are the essential European data protection standards and the European 
values of proportionality and accountability. 62 The CJEU further  clarifi ed these 
principles when it recently stated that the planned agreement on the transfer of 
Passenger Name Record Data to Canada partly does not meet requirements of 
fundamental rights and data protection in the European Union. 63 It is therefore 
up to the  European public authorities, including Europol and Eurojust, to raise 
the  ‘ European ’ voice when it comes to data transfers from and to third countries, 
in particular the US. The agreements of Europol and Eurojust on the exchange 
of data with third parties might be put under overall critical scrutiny and review 
in the light of the previous and future case law of the CJEU on European data 
protection standards. 
 B. A Vision of Checks and Balances 
 Accountability, judicial control and judicial review are some of the crucial issues 
in the  ‘ safe harbour ’ decision. This is why the decision brings us to the second 
challenge of both agencies, namely accountability of cross-border cooperation. 
Today, accountability is the icon for good governance, democratic governance and 
judicial control. 64 
 Judicial control has been considerably strengthened since the pre-Lisbon days 
of the  ‘ third pillar ’ framework. 65 This is a consequence of the improvement and 
strengthening of judicial control by the CJEU under the Lisbon Treaty. The CJEU 
may, in principle, exercise a certain level of control, not only over the validity and 
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interpretation of the rules laid down in the agencies ’ constitutive instruments but 
also over their actions, in accordance with the limits enshrined in the general pro-
visions of the TFEU. 
 The current Regulation on Europol, as well as the current proposal for a Regula-
tion on Eurojust, address the question of democratic accountability in the broad 
project of  ‘ Lisbonisation ’ of both EU agencies. Articles 85 and 88 TFEU explicitly 
provide for involvement of the European Parliament and national parliaments in 
democratic oversight of the two bodies, as a result of an overall strengthening of 
their roles under the Lisbon Treaty. 66 
 Regulation (EU) 2016/794 foresees the establishment of a Joint Parliamentary 
Scrutiny Group (JPSG), which will consist of members of the competent commit-
tee of the European Parliament 67 and the national parliaments. 68 How the over-
sight works in practice remains unclear, since this form of accountability is new 
in the area of European criminal law enforcement. Thus, the JPSG will certainly 
have a pioneering role. Its task will be to  ‘ politically monitor Europol ’ s activities 
in fulfi lling its mission, including as regards the impact of those activities on the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons ’ (emphasis added). 69 The 
re ference to  ‘ political monitoring ’ implies that parliamentary scrutiny is excluded 
for Europol ’ s day-to-day work, in particular for its operational work. 70 To take 
a current topic, the JPSG will therefore not be able to shed light on the issue as 
to how Europol procures for big data analysis — an issue on which the national 
governments and the European Commission have not been willing to disclose 
information. 71 
 Europol is obliged to transmit to the JPSG certain documents, such as threat 
assessments or strategic analysis reports, administrative arrangements, the multi-
annual programming or annual work programme of Europol, and the evalua-
tion report drawn up by the Commission. Although the JPSG may request other 
re levant documents, Regulation (EU) 2016/794 clearly intends to deny the parlia-
mentary watchdog access to important information that is marked  ‘ classifi ed ’ . 72 
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The JPSG should be fed by Europol only with more or less general, even regularly 
publicly available information, and additional information requests are subject to 
the requirement of their necessity for the fulfi lment of the JPSG ’ s task relating to 
political monitoring. 73 
 Even if the JPSG does indeed identify problems, the JPSG is only entitled to 
draw up  ‘ summary conclusions ’ on the political monitoring of Europol and sub-
mit those conclusions to the European Parliament and national parliaments. The 
European Parliament will forward them for  information purposes to the Council, 
the Commission and Europol. 74 It is to be expected that Europol does not have to 
fear direct consequences of this parliamentary scrutiny. 
 Regarding these material, procedural and factual limitations, the — often long 
awaited — democratic control of Europol by the parliaments may turn out to be a 
 ‘ blunt sword ’ only. 75 
 Whether parliamentary oversight of Eurojust will be designed in a parallel way 
still remains to be seen. 76 However, the current draft Regulation is less promising. 
The content of the draft is restricted to setting up limited reporting duties of 
 Eurojust, in particular to transmit its annual activity report to the European 
 Parliament and the national parliaments. Parliamentary discussions on  ‘ specifi c 
operational cases ’ is explicitly excluded. 77 One might wonder whether it is right 
that democratic control over Eurojust can remain steps behind the level of control 
over Europol. However, this issue must be reserved for a more in-depth analysis 
that cannot be carried out here. 
 IV. Conclusion 
 One thing has become clear in the last decade: both Europol, processing an enor-
mous amount of data and planning to take (police) action in cyberspace, and 
Eurojust, in charge of facilitating judicial cooperation in the real world in and 
outside of the European Union, today represent the European face of tackling 
cross-border crime. Considering the various challenges for criminal justice sys-
tems today, the EU Member States and the European agencies must ensure that 
they can master their tasks. Overall, we believe that — looking at the evolution 
of Europol and Eurojust — their relationship is not about a  ‘ race ’ , but about joint 
efforts. Each body has stepped in to fulfi ll the role and function assigned to them. 
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Law in action might have turned out differently in certain respects than the draw-
ing board visions of European cooperation in criminal matters. 
 At a time when Europe is under pressure, its bodies, agencies and institutions 
serve as an example. When, in certain countries, there is a political shift towards 
greater nationalism and in others the balance between security and individual 
freedom shifts more towards security, European bodies, agencies and institutions 
should stand up for European solutions. 
 Europol has already been  ‘ Lisbonised ’ , when it started its work as the  ‘ EU Agency 
for Law Enforcement Cooperation ’ on 1 May 2017, when the new Regulation 
replacing and repealing the previous Europol legal framework entered into force. 
 Eurojust still awaits its new  ‘ Lisbonised ’ legal basis. The delay is also due to the fact 
that Member States decided to fi rst dedicate themselves to set up the European 
Public Prosecutor ’ s Offi ce and put aside negotiations on a Regulation on Eurojust. 
Hence, Europol starts to work according to a mandate that has been endorsed and 
will intensify its work on operational analysis. A new form of data handling has 
been established — including data mining operations — which may lead to the not 
improbable scenario that Europol works as a  pace-setter at the European level and 
Eurojust solely as an  insurer of judicial follow-up of police results. 
 It is therefore all the more important that both EU agencies act jointly as they 
have done in the past. 78 At the same time, competent actors at both levels must 
ensure that European values and the all-embracing commitment to individual 
rights and liberties are not sacrifi ced on the altar of short-term law enforcement 
actions. Standing up for European values concerns Europol, Eurojust, as well as all 
European institutions and all its citizens. 
 
 
